IFALPA focuses on volcanic ash policy

The International Federation of Airline Pilot Associations (IFALPA) has delivered a comprehensive policy document on volcanic ash operations from the pilots'perspective.

The document, which was released late last week provides an excellent summary of the issues and challenges inherent; and makes several recommendations designed to encourage the early development of policies.

Following are extracts from the Paper, but the full document can be accessed through the IFALPA website:

Civil aviation has developed a ‘safety-first’ principle which should not be abandoned as a result of the economic pressures caused by the recent airspace closures. This means that the current principle of conservative avoidance should be maintained unless demonstrably safe hazard threshold criteria can be applied. These include accurate modelling or measurement of the hazard and certification criteria for flight in the hazard area that includes mitigation measures catering for longer term effects.

Finally, the ultimate responsibility for the safe conduct of a flight rests with the Pilot-In-Command. The Pilot-In-Command must therefore be given adequate tools, training information and guidelines to deal with volcanic ash.

From 1980 to 2005, more than 100 turbojet aircraft have sustained volcanic ash damage, with repair costs in excess of $250 million dollars. Seven of these encounters caused temporary engine failure, and three of the aircraft involved temporarily lost all engine power. Whereas most documented engine failure events have occurred in the overhead plume relatively close to the eruption, some engine failures took place in downstream ash clouds as far away as 600 miles from the erupting volcano.

Recommendation 1:

New SARPs and Guidance Materials are needed to ensure safety and minimise disruption to air travel in case of future eruptions. Revised procedures shall be based on data from scientific research; global volcanic ash standards (composition, concentration, etc); certified engine and airframe operations; reliable and fast (ideally real time) information on the hazards; etc.

Recommendation 2:

IFALPA strongly supports research to validate a safe and practicable boundary for acceptable ash concentration exposure. The introduction of standardised limitations must be based on a safety risk assessment.

Recommendation 3:

IFALPA believes that additional refinement of the model(s) will indicate more reliable and precise defined airspace volumes (3D) of ash hazards. Furthermore, whenever the dispersion of volcanic ash is forecast the extent of the airspace volume(s) estimated to be above the acceptable threshold concentration should be verified and validated by in-flight measurements otherwise a conservative safety buffer should be applied.

Recommendation 4:

IFALPA believes that a global approach is needed that allows for a tailor-made solution for any airspace concerned. Operators and flight crews are primarily responsible for safe flight operations and thus general no-fly restrictions should be minimised. Operations should be left subject to the operators’ safety risk assessment that is acceptable to the overseeing national regulator (safety oversight authority). ANSPs should have contingency plans available, based on Regional Air Navigation Agreement.

Recommendation 5:

Regional contingency plans should also consider potential effects of volcanic ash on aerodromes in the region.

Recommendation 6: The Aircraft Operations Certificate (AOC) holder must conduct a safety risk assessments prior to planned operations within or in the vicinity of volcanic ash. The risk assessment must include all affected stakeholders and must satisfy the acceptable level of safety prescribed by the safety oversight authority. The risk assessment must include clearly definable threat scenarios, actions, training and other mitigations.

Recommendation 7:

IFALPA strongly believes that several issues must be resolved to guarantee safe flight in a volcanic ash environment with maximum flexible use of the available airspace. The underlying goal should always be to plan a flight path that will be free from significant ash hazards. To achieve this goal the following requirements shall be accomplished:

1. Identify the hazards.

a. Perform adequate research on the short and long term effects of volcanic ash on the entire aircraft and their occupants.

b. Conduct an in-depth risk analysis for the hazards of aircraft operation in VA.

c. Establish generic engine ash tolerance levels based on actual data and research for relevant ash parameters: content concentration, particle size/type/properties and acidity.

2. Identify the contaminated airspace.

a. Improve modelling, measurement and/or sensing accuracy of ash particle size and density in volcanic ash clouds. Compile experience and data from present and past encounters and test flights.

b. VAAC must deliver relevant data in an accurate, timely and robust way by means of measurement, imaging, modelling and validation.

c. The appropriate safety oversight authority shall establish a danger area, where necessary.

d. Uniform global criteria for closure of (parts of) airspace should be applied in case of unacceptable hazardous ash concentrations (the no-fly black zone). Closure should be based on unambiguous validated data and executed in accordance with global ‘closure criteria’.

e. Implementation of one or more intermediate levels of ash hazard/concentration with restrictive use and additional operating rules and maintenance requirements (e.g. red, orange zone) needs further study and validation.

3. Flight Operation.

a. Responsibility for flight operations should remain with the operators, except for hazardous high-density ash levels exceeding aircraft and engine tolerance limitations (black zone). The black zone should be defined by the National Safety Oversight Authorities responsible for regulating flight operations, not by Air Traffic Management authorities or Air Navigation Service Providers.

b. The operator must fulfil this responsibility for a safe flight and conduct a safety risk assessment prior to any operation in low-concentration ash (grey, red, orange zones) and get approval from his Safety Oversight Authority. The operators should effectively train crews for operation in these zones.

c. The Pilot-In-Command is ultimately responsible for safe flight and must therefore have insight in all relevant ash data and specific aircraft procedures. As the person ultimately responsible, the Pilot-In-Command must retain the final decision whether a flight can be conducted safely.

d. Operators should refrain from any disciplinary actions when flight crews exercise their flight safety responsibility not to fly in ash (i.e. delay departure or diversion).

e. VFR operations (“See and avoid”) shall not be considered as a suitable method of conducting commercial air transport operations in, or near, ash. A restriction to fly in potentially or actually contaminated areas only under daylight VMC might be an adequate mitigation measure to avoid high ash concentration, but does not necessarily protect from low ash concentration that might still be hazardous.