Airline pilot training and recruitment: Topical issues

VISION & PREPARATION

 

Safety: is always the stated priority yet pilot training remains reactive.  The airline accident rate has plateaued, and more growth at the same rate will lead to more accidents.  The rate must be reduced further, but hardware has already developed impressively through four generations of airliners, with ‘generation five’ some time away.  So human-ware is the obvious target at this time.  Improved pilot selection and training present the next real opportunity to control and reduce accident rates.

 

Pilot sourcing: Experienced pilots exiting military service or general aviation may not be uniformly available, nor adequate to meet the demand ahead.  Type rated pilots can be sourced (poached) from other operators at a price, but may not always be available.  Training a pilot cadet from college to airline type rating takes at least two years, yet new airliner deliveries have been grounded without pilots to fly them.  As aircraft orders are usually known at least two years out, any aircraft unmanned on entry to service suggests lack of foresight in the planning process. 

 

Crew selection and training: Perceptions may exist that crew selection and training are ‘back-office’ costs rather than core airline business.  From the following CAPA (Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation) survey in 2009, it would certainly seem that training quality was considered to be the lowest priority of all. 

Could this perception stem from the idea that compliance with regulations ensures safety?

 

 

SHORTAGES

Despite the global recession, a serious shortage of airline professionals is developing in 2011.   Respected airlines accustomed to extensive waiting lists of potential recruits suddenly face challenges in manning ahead for new aircraft deliveries 

 

WHY?

A number of factors have converged into an almost ‘perfect storm’ impacting pilot provisioning:  

1. Recruitments freezes starting early in the global recession
2. Reduced availability of alternative sources such as ex-military and general aviation pilots
3. Continuing growth; projected as a doubling of the global fleet over the next 20 years; (ICAO, IATA, airliner manufacturer delivery schedules)
4. Earlier deferment of shortages through progressive extensions of the pilot retirement age to 65
5. The eventual arrival of a non-linear surge of baby-boomer retirement at age 65
6. Reduced interest in piloting careers from new (research-savvy) generations
7. Lack of instructors (both numbers and quality) at many levels in the training system

 

TREND TOWARDS CADET ENTRY

While the picture described is uneven across the world, poaching of pilots provides a short-term fix for those airlines able to afford superior inducements.  But this source will inevitably dry up, and without the numbers of ex-military or general aviation pilots traditionally available, the primary source of new recruits must trend towards cadet entry.  Analysts may say that the airline industry will ‘self-correct’ via market forces, but if proactive improvements are not made now to shore up the safety system, accident rates may escalate, and public perception of air travel could impact the industry in unpredictable ways.

 

The issues in greater detail:

 

PREVIOUS PILOT GENERATIONS

• Experience was a hard teacher. First came the test, then the lesson.  You started with a bag full of luck and an empty bag of experience. The trick was to fill the bag of experience before you emptied the bag of luck
• Experience is the knowledge that enables you to recognize a mistake when you make it again.  Good judgment comes from experience and deep experience may unfortunately stem from bad judgment

A generation retires:  Airlines are now losing many of those more experienced pilots who have been  gatekeeping safety.  The baby boomer pilot generation has stayed on as the retirement age was extended.  Their generation acquired skills at the school of hard-knocks, often in the military, in a different environment of challenge.  Aviation was only just over half a century old then.  Decision-making time was more available at lower aircraft speeds (never let an airplane take you somewhere your brain didn't get to five minutes earlier), but there was less help from technology. As they retire, a wealth of experience will also depart, and the ‘centre of gravity’ of piloting experience on flight decks will degrade.  Equivalent improvements in the quality of selection and training must be found 

 

Dependence on maths and motor skills:  A sound knowledge of Mathematics and Physics were imperatives for pilots, as calculations had to be made ‘on the fly’.  Critical performance computations were made with reference to charts and graphs, with many opportunities for extrapolation error.  Gross-error checks were everyday requirements.  Rarely did an aircraft take off following performance calculation errors of up to 1/3^rd of total aircraft weight, as has been the case in one recent near-fatal airline incident. 

 

Deeper experiential learning:  Many older-gen airline pilots received their initial training in the military where the boundaries of aircraft performance were explored.  Stalling, spinning, and aerobatics were basic components of early training; core survival responses were acquired in unusual situations. Systems were more simple and procedures not as extensive as they are today.  Deeper function had to be learnt and understood in detail to enable informed trouble shooting in emergencies.  

 

NEW PILOT GENERATIONS

‘2-year olds can manipulate I-pads today’ 

The perspectives of new gens may differ markedly from those of their parents, due to torrents of digital information from vastly wider horizons.  From their earliest days information technology has become the primary information-gathering source; providing knowledge millions of times more available than for their parents.  By comparison, traditional education systems have become monotonous and un-stimulating.  

 

Outcomes:   Commensurate changes to the characteristics of the pilot recruitment pool may already have occurred:

• Some cases of attention deficit disorder (ADHD) may in part be a manifestation of continuous information bombardment we are subject to today 
• Focus, attention span, and self-discipline may be relatively degraded by repeated distraction. 
• Networking ‘chat rooms’ may seem to be ‘collective’ activity, but from the corner of a room at home, the participant communicates in isolation from real people.  Such experience may not prepare crew members well to operate in a real-life teamwork environment
• Greater dependence and trust in technology can disable ‘gross-error-checking’ of digital information.
• There is an abundance of career information ‘just google it’.  But airline blogs tend to emphasise the negative, and surfers may be easily dissuaded from a second look. 
• The ‘passion’ for piloting may have become more rare.
• A piloting career may now be seen as a second or third career choice.

 

Strengths to capitalize on:  The world-wide-web provides a common platform for young people from various cultures to share understanding of similar concepts gleaned from the information age.  One downside is that the ‘private and secret world’ of the web combined with access to technology, can trigger almost unlimited creativity; a potential blocker in a world of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).  However internet sourcing enables more rapid self-learning; and subconscious ‘programming’ may result in more convergent thinking; strengths for new generation recruits.

 

AUTOMATION

Any one can hold the helm when the sea is calm?- Publilius Syrus

Many routine flight deck tasks have been automated, and a long haul pilot today may handle the aircraft manually for only 3 hours per year.   Many aircraft are now protected from structural overstress, over-bank, over-speed, and stalls by pre-programmed computers.  Deep system details may not all be made available to pilots, as control of such systems may not be possible. Statistically, automation has undoubtedly reduced incidents and accidents in the airline industry, but lurking threats remain.   

 

The rare event:  The travelling public expects professional pilots to be ready for any system failure and automation anomaly (however rare).  This sometimes requires pilots to be adaptive and creative.  For example, the recent uncontained failure of an engine on the Qantas A380 flight (QF 32), was not supposed to happen by design or certification, but it did.  The resulting systems degradation was so complex and severe that it generated anomalous system failure indications.  Consider this extract from the Aerospace International (January 2011):  the ‘avalanche’ of messages from the A380’s systems [some contradicting each other] meant that the crew had to draw on their full resources to decide which were important and which could be disregarded.  Another point was in ‘tricking the performance calculator to come up with an acceptable landing speed – again a demonstration of superb airmanship so vital in these incidents

 

The training gap:  Automation has recently defended the safety system so impressively that there has been some relaxation in training requirements.  For example, full stall training was excluded from ab-initio syllabus for many years.  Yet a rare upset event, combined with other failures, has catastrophic potential for the unprepared.  When automation failure combines with unexpected attitudes, some pilots may not have fully developed all competencies necessary to overcome the ‘startle factor, and recognize and recover rapidly. The violent physiological sensations possible during an upset may block corrective action, however much pre-learnt guidance has been received in the security of a classroom or simulator.  Except for high and heavy cruise, airliners today operate within a normal flight envelope only a fraction of the total available, and experience in extremes cannot be routinely acquired.  But the industry does have a number of development initiatives underway to address upset recovery and prevention training (UPRT), with interim solutions already in use.

Hardware challenges:  Aircraft manufacturers will explain that they "design aeroplanes that keep the pilot in the loop" while others will say the “autopilot is better adapted to perform certain maneuvers than a human being” (particularly under stress).  A good example is turbulence encounters or an aircraft approaching over-speed, where it is often stated (and sometimes trained) to re-engage the autopilot (A/P) to regain control rather than by manual flying.   In other scenarios advice is sometimes given to fly manually until the system failure is understood and control is regained.  One manufacturer may recommend keeping the A/P engaged down to low altitudes while another go manual at a much earlier point.   Throughout their careers pilots need to hold and then discard a vast chunks of knowledge, often because aircraft manufacturers have not (and maybe never will) come up with a common cockpit, flight control systems or harmonized Standard Operating Procedures.  Partly-discarded knowledge from earlier types can confuse and lurk as a latent pathogen in the safety system.

 

‘More than’ SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures):  Young men know the rules, but old men know the exceptions. 

Traditionalists may worry that inexperienced pilots will not be able to recognise when to apply standard operating procedures, and when to overlay their ‘own solution’.  Some years ago in Hong Kong, a non-extinguishable engine fire on take-off (heavy B747-400) required rapid decision-making and the bypassing of many SOPs so as to get the burning overweight aircraft back on the ground in 11 minutes, and evacuate the passengers safely.  Blind adherence to SOPS may not always be appropriate, and ‘good airmanship’ must sometimes dominate.    

 

Legacy Training:  Most new airline cadets still face a prescriptive training syllabus, largely unchanged for decades.  This is particularly true of the Airline Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL) theory.  Trainees may be taught via a box-ticking rather than competency-based process.  They will learn to fly the airliner primarily through automation, and be protected from unscripted scenarios.  They will graduate less versed in flying skills required near the edge of the envelope; less able to address the unexpected; yet legally licensed and type rated to fly public transport aircraft.

 

New needs:  We cannot gain experience safely in the same way as earlier generations.  Therefore training providers must apply higher impact training strategies to embed the big messages deeply into the minds of cadets at the earliest stage; to be reinforced in later recurrent training.  But before we train we must re-build a pool of interest and recruit more effectively.

 

 

SELECTION & RECRUITMENT

Measure a thousand times and cut once  -Turkish proverb

 

Provocative questions:  If a professional is required for a safety-critical role spanning 30 years or more, should an operator:

(1) conduct the shortest possible selection process to keeps costs down?

(2) utilise only non-operational selectors to establish personality fit? 

(3) not provide details of the ‘downside’ of an airline career to permit candidates to opt out early?

(4) not run robust team, flight and simulator grading exercises for candidates?

(5) not use all sources of historical data to update and improve selection effectiveness in a scientific way?

(6) not operate a feedback loop from operations back to selection

 

The best investment: Hopefully the answer is a firm NO to all of the above   Time and money spent at the start of this career will be very well spent in comparison to millions lost in downstream failure.  Effective selection is the first point of action, where no costs have yet been sunk. Although pre-screening should assess basic attributes such as academic suitability, English language, aptitude, and health, motivation is key. High levels of motivation can overcome many other limitations.  Selection tools with greater emphasis on motivation may be worth greater consideration.

 

Contemporary de-motivators:  In recent years, salaries and benefits paid to professional pilots have declined in parallel with increasing challenges faced by the industry.  Today the passenger gets more choice, comfort, convenience and speed, at a lower real cost.  Yet over the same period, airline costs rose multiples of 1960s costs.  More recently, during 9/11, SARS, and the ash crisis, the industry lost more money than it made since WW2 (USD 38 billion) [-source DG IATA].   As part of cost control measures, airlines have even resorted to student self-funding among other cost control measures.   It is no surprise that piloting careers are less attractive.

 

Early promotion:  Today more has to be done within the education system to increase the attractiveness of airline careers.  In order to inspire and enthuse youngsters to join, there is evidence from a recent US study that a ‘high-value’ age-bracket is between 7 and 8 years old.  Despite the negative airline blogs seen on the web, there are still many great features of an airline-piloting career and this must be explained early and with balance

 

Training - Who will pay?   It has become routine to expect student pilots to pay for their training; which excludes many.  But the supply-demand situation is changing, and the ‘who pays’ cycle may transfer training costs back to airlines, despite the apparent cost challenge that this will entail.  Yet a quick calculation of the costs associated with the grounding of new delivery $200M airliner will expose the value of planning a ‘training-in-time’ policy.

REGULATORY MATTERS

Most regulations rightly defend the ‘bottom lines’ of existing regulations but may not always keep pace with the operational needs of this fast developing industry.  An ever-present threat is that minimum regulatory requirements become ‘budgetary maximums.’  

An unregulated airline industry would be disastrous, and regulations must provide minimum standards.  But airlines may use regulations as a crutch to apply minimum standards as maximum training budgets, as a form of ‘legal compliance’.  Regulatory standards alone cannot ensure optimal levels of airline safety, and there are multiple variables in play, including politics, economics, organizational cultures, and industrial issues.  So it can happen that legacy regulation is not replaced by best practice, as for example the traditional Commercial Pilot License training requirements, established in 1947, continuing to impose outdated content, and to omit critical contemporary training needs. 

 

Global oversight: ICAO holds a UN mandate to provide global industry guidance through Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), derived from industry need.  Nevertheless, some of the largest National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) file volumes of differences against ICAO SARPS, citing adequacy of existing local regulations.  Some examples of sluggish adoption and compliance are:

 

1. Aviation English: ICAO Document 9835, published in November 2003, prescribes basic Aviation English requirements for ATC controllers and flight crews operating in international airspace.  Seven years since publication, there have been many adoption and compliance delays.  Despite increasing use of technology, important safety messages cannot be accurately communicated in this environment.

 

1. Multi-Crew Pilots License:  ICAO Document 9868 was published in November 2006, prescribing the first ever ‘through train’ requirements for airline pilots, and the first major update for 60 years to the legacy CPL process.   The ICAO Flight Crew Licensing and Training Panel [FCLTP] took 5 years to develop MPL, involving 64 participants nominated by 18 Contracting States and five international organizations.   Despite limited but superb graduate feedback, five years after publication, MPL is still not yet widely adopted.

 

1. Updated Criteria for Simulation:  ICAO Doc 9625, published in 2009, reduces the global range of simulator categories from 27 to 7.  The UK Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) International Working Group spent many years developing doc 9625 with the objective of harmonizing the training industry with devices allocated to specific training needs, yet global adoption of this recommended standard remains a remote prospect.

 

It is therefore time for ICAO contracting States, together with industry groups such as IATA, to accelerate training industry improvements. A more harmonized approach, combining outputs from LOSA (Line Operational Safety Audit), NGAP (ICAO Next Generation Aviation Professionals), IOSA (IATA Operational Safety Audit), ITQI (IATA Training and Quality Initiative), IFALPA (International Federation of Airline Pilots), and FSF (Flight Safety Foundation) to name a few organisations active in better practices, should together move selection and training forward to meet the challenges ahead.

 

SUMMARY

Well established organizations can become stagnant under philosophy of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”   “Today, an

organisation unprepared to reinvent itself into improved process may face extinction”. (Anon)

 

Projections suggest that the global demand for new airline pilots over the next 20 years may approach 500,000, or about 25,000 new pilots per year.  To provide a sense of regional need, China projections show a need for over 3,000 new pilots per year (12% of the global total), yet China can only produce 800-1,200 new commercial pilots trained in-country each year.   No airline is likely to be completely spared some impact from the growth ahead. 

 

Should operators be prepared to send pilots to remote underutilized training centres, overall global capacity is just adequate to meet current demand.  ATOs in some regions have excess and in others insufficient.  However the known ramp-up of capacity will not meet future global demand.  And we may ask, will the students be there to train?    If they are, the required ramp-up of training may have to be on a scale not yet seen, and the required quality and relevance of this training to a standard not yet reached.   The multiple threats of outdated recruitment and training practices, a decline in average experience levels, less career interest, and fewer quality instructors, will lead to poor safety outcomes.

 

Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.  H.G. Wells

 

 

John Bent has served as a pilot and training manager in the RAF, general aviation, four airlines, and with an independent training supplier.  As an RAF QFI, airline instructor pilot and examiner, type rated on 28 aircraft, a large part of John’s career was devoted to pilot training policy and development.  Start-up projects included the launch of an International School in Hong Kong, the Airbus (A340/A330) fleet entry to Cathay Pacific Airways, GECAT Asia, and two new TRTOs (Type Rating Training Organisations).  John has attended IOSA auditor, FSTD quality, and SMS training.  He managed three airline FTOs (Flight Training Organisations); and has presented at 70 international aviation training and safety symposiums.  Currently co-founding a training academy in China, John is also consultant to IATA for the implementation of the MPL under the IATA Training and Qualification Initiative (ITQI).